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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-16 and § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the Commission's decision that the usage of 
the Subject Property qualified that property for greenbelt 
assessment rational and reasonable? 
2. Can a decision regarding taxation of property, 
based on its usage, for one tax year be res judicata as to the 
taxability of that property in a subsequent year? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Respondents Judd submit that the following statutes are 
determinative of the issues presented by this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503: 
(1) For general property tax purposes, the 
value of land under this part is the value 
which the land has for agricultural use if 
the land: 
(a) is not less than five contiguous 
acres in area, except where devoted to 
agricultural use in conjunction with other 
eligible acreage or as provided under Sub-
section (3) ; 
(b) has a gross income from agricul-
tural use, not including rental income, of 
at least $1000 per year; 
(c) is actively devoted to agricultural 
use; and 
(d) has been devoted to agricultural 
use for at least two successive years 
immediately preceding the tax year in 
issue. 
(2) Land which (a) is subject to the privi-
lege tax imposed by Section 59-4-101, (b) is 
owned by the state or any of its political 
subdivisions, and (c) meets the requirements 
of Subsection (1), is eligible for assessment 
based on its agricultural value. 
(3) The commission may grant a waiver of 
the acreage limitation, upon appeal by the 
owner and submission of proof that 80% or 
more of the owner's, purchaser's, or lessee's 
income is derived from agricultural products 
produced on the property in question. 
(4) (a) The commission may grant a waiver 
of the income limitation for the tax year 
in issue, upon appeal by the owner and sub-
mission of proof that the land was valued 
on the basis of agricultural use for at 
least two years immediately preceding that 
tax year, and that the failure to meet the 
income requirements for that tax year was 
due to no fault or act of the owner, pur-
chaser, or lessee. 
(b) As used in this section, "fault" 
does not include the intentional planting 
of crops or trees which, because of the 
maturation period, do not give the owner, 
purchaser, or lessee a reasonable opportu-
nity to satisfy the income requirement. 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-15(4): 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, 
it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute 
or rule on which the agency action is 
-2-
based, is unconstitutional on its face or 
as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the 
jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of 
the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously inter-
preted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlaw-
ful procedure or decision-making process, 
or has failed to follow prescribed 
procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency 
action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by 
the agency, that is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion 
delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the 
agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's 
prior practice, unless the agency jus-
tifies the inconsistency by giving 
facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the incon-
sistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or 
capricious. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("Board") 
has sought review by this Court of the ruling of the Utah State 
Tax Commission ("Commission"), granting Respondents Judd's Appli-
cation for greenbelt assessment of certain real property under 
the Farmland Assessment Act ("FAA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-501, 
et seq,, for the tax year 1989. The Commission entered a final 
Decision and Order on May 8, 1991, after a formal hearing, hold-
ing that the Judds1 property qualified for FAA assessment in 
1989. The Board filed a petition for review of the Commission's 
decision, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16, on May 31, 
1991. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Judds have owned certain real property in Salt 
Lake County for many years (the "Original Property"). In 1976, 
the Judds applied for "greenbelt" assessment of the Original 
Property under the FAA. R.31, U 1. 
2. The County Assessor accepted the Judds* petition, 
on the grounds that the Original Property qualified for FAA 
assessment. Thereafter, that property, at all times, has been 
assessed as greenbelt property under the provisions of the FAA. 
R.31, 11 1. 
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3. In December, 1980, the Judds agreed to sell a por-
tion of the Original Property (the "Subdivision Property") to Jim 
Pappas, who intended to develop a subdivision on the property. 
Mr. Pappas recorded a subdivision plat for the Subdivision Prop-
erty with the Salt Lake County Recorder in 1983. R.31, HU 2,4. 
4. In connection with the Pappas transaction, all of 
the Subdivision Property was conveyed to McGhie Land Title Com-
pany while initial steps in the development process took place. 
R.31, 11 5. However, as part of the consideration for the Judds1 
sale to Mr. Pappas, the Judds retained beneficial ownership of a 
portion of the Subdivision Property. Id., 11 3. Therefore, that 
portion of the Subdivision Property designated by Mr. Pappas as 
"Lots 1 through 16" was ultimately reconveyed to the Judds, with 
curb and gutter, sewer and utility hookups, all added at Mr. 
Pappas1 expense. Id. , HU 3,4,8. A plat map showing both the 
Original Property and the Subdivision Property is attached hereto 
as Appendix 2. 
5. In 1985, the Salt Lake County Assessor determined 
that Lots 1 through 16 (then owned in their entirety by the 
Judds) did not qualify for greenbelt assessment. R.31, U 8; 
R.21. The Board now contends that this determination was made 
because of the recording of the subdivision plat map and the 
minor improvements that had been made pursuant to the Judds1 
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agreement with Mr. Pappas. R.31, H 8. However, the Judds1 posi-
tion is that the determination in 1985 was solely due to the 
Assessor's position that Lots 1 through 16 were "not in agricul-
tural use." R.21. In any event, the Judds were then subjected 
to a rollback tax for those lots for the year 1985. 
6. The Judds appealed the County Assessor's decision 
to withdraw Lots 1 through 16 from FAA assessment for the tax 
year 1985 to the Commission and, ultimately, to the Tax Division 
of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. Judge 
David Young rendered a decision in 1990 (Civil No. 87-3472), 
holding that the Judds had failed to establish that Lots 1 
through 16 were qualified for greenbelt assessment for the tax 
year 1985. R.33, Ut 9,10; R.16, U 6. 
7. The Judds subsequently transferred ownership of 
Lots 1, 2, 3 and 16 to third parties, and those lots are not at 
issue in this appeal. R.53, H 2. In 1989, Lots 4 through 15 
were assessed as a subdivision. Petitioner's Brief at 9, 11 14. 
The Judds appealed that assessment and requested FAA assessment 
of Lots 4 through 15 (the "Subject Property"), which are immedi-
ately adjacent to the remainder of the Original Property. Id. , 
11 15; Appendix 2. 
8. No physical barriers separate the Subject Property 
from the remainder of the Original Property. The only "division" 
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exists by virtue of a line on the recorded plat map. Indeed, the 
Judd Farm, consisting of both the remainder of the Original Prop-
erty and the Subject Property, was fenced as one contiguous par-
cel between 1987 and 1989.-1 R.22; R.15, 11 5. 
9. In 1987, the entire Judd Farm, including both the 
Original Property and the Subject Property, was leased to Stanley 
Diamond, who grew wheat on the combined property. R.15, H 6. 
10. Bateman Farms replaced Diamond as the property 
lessee in 1987, after the harvest. Bateman Farms cultivated the 
land and then placed it in a crop-land retirement program admin-
istered by the United States Department of Agriculture, for the 
1988 crop year. During the fall of 1988, Bateman Farms again 
planted wheat on the property, which was harvested during the 
summer of 1989. Subsequently, Bateman Farms again placed the 
combined property in the federal crop land retirement program, 
for the year 1990. R.15, U 6. 
11. Thus, for the years 1987 through 1989, the Origi-
nal Property and the Subject Property were operated as a single 
unit, and were subject to agricultural uses, all of which are 
recognized under the FAA. R.15, IW 5,6; R.22; R.33, 11 12. 
1
 The Board's repeated use of the phrase "improved building lots" with 
respect to the Subject Property is both self-serving and misleading. There is 
no evidence, nor any contention, that any buildings have ever been constructed 
on the Subject Property. 
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12. The area of the Subject Property, by itself, con-
stitutes less than five acres. However, the area of the entire 
Judd Farm, which is operated as a single unit, is in excess of 
twenty acres. R.15, 1IH 3,4; Petitioner's Brief at 25. 
13. The annual agricultural income from the combined 
Judd Farm property exceeded $1,000 for each year during 1987-89. 
R.15, 11 5; Petitioner's Brief at 8-9, 1111 11-13. 
14. The Board never has contended that the Original 
Property, or the remainder of the Original Property, is not prop-
erly assessed under the provisions of the FAA. R.33, K 12. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission's decision, finding that the Judd Farm 
is subject to greenbelt assessment under the FAA, in its 
entirety, invoLved mixed questions of law and fact. Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d), and Utah common law, review of 
such questions is based upon a standard of reasonableness and 
rationality. In addition, agency expertise, particularly in con-
nection with matters, such as taxation, deemed peculiarly within 
the agency's realm of competence, are accorded a great deal of 
deference. 
Thus, agency decisions reviewable by this Court pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16, come cloaked within a fairly 
high degree of legitimacy, particularly where the decisions 
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involve resolution of mixed questions of law and fact. The 
applicability of the FAA to the property at issue in this case 
presents just such questions. Therefore, it is up to the Board, 
as the appellant, to convince this Court that the Commission's 
decision was beyond the realm of reasonableness. That, the Board 
has not even attempted to do, instead, relying heavily on the 
concept of res judicata. 
However, the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable 
to the issue of taxability of real property in a tax year that is 
different from a tax year involved in a prior adjudication. This 
is particularly true where, as here, the issue of taxability is 
use-dependent, and each tax year must be determined on its own 
merits. 
Finally, the Board's third argument, that the Subject 
Property does not meet the statutory requirements under the FAA, 
is based upon the erroneous premise that the Subject Property 
stands on its own for all statutory determinations. On the con-
trary, the very reason that the Commission ruled in the Judds' 
favor below is that the Subject Property is operated as a single 
farming unit, along with the remainder of the Original Property. 
That being the case, the Board can no more require that the Sub-
ject Property separately qualify for FAA assessment than it can 
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impose suet a burden upon an individual acreage component cf the 
Original Property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION MUST BE UPHELD 
BECAUSE IT IS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS. 
A. The Review Standard Applicable to the 
Present Action is "Reasonableness and 
Rationality." 
In connection with any consideration of the appropri-
ateness of a decision of a lower court or administrative agency, 
the initial question that must be addressed is the standard of 
appellate review. Significantly, the Board fails even to address 
the standard of review in its brief. The standard applicable to 
review of formal agency adjudications has existed by statute, 
within the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), since 
1988. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17 provides that final agency 
actions resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings are 
appealed immediately to Utah's appellate courts. Subsection 4 of 
that statute (set out in full, supra) provides the only grounds 
upon which relief may be granted by the appellate courts, includ-
ing, that "the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law," (subsection (4)(d)), and "the agency action is otherwise 
arbitrary or capricious" (subsection (4)(h)(iv)). 
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This statute has been interpreted by the Utah courts to 
continue the existing common law, three-level, standard of 
review. Thus, pure questions of law are deemed to be equally 
well suited to judicial and agency expertise and are therefore 
governed by a "correction of error" standard. See Hurley v. 
Board of Review of the Industrial Comm. of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 
527 (Utah 1988). In effect, that standard is one of no deference 
to the agency's decision. 
The statute slightly changed the standard applicable to 
purely factual questions, which are now subject to a test of 
"substantial evidence." That standard has been deemed satisfied 
by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion." Johnson v. Department of 
Employment Security, 782 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah App. 1989). Signif-
icantly, the substantial evidence requirement does not mean that 
only one conclusion from the evidence is permissible. Hurley, 
supra, 767, P.2d at 526-27. Moreover, "the party challenging the 
[factual] findings. . . must marshal all of the evidence support-
ing the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the 
Tax Commission's findings are not supported by substantial evi-
dence." Boston First National Bank of Boston v. County Board of 
-11-
E q u a l i z a t i o n of S a l t Lake County, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 
1 9 9 0 ) . 2 
The most d e f e r e n t i a l s t anda rd of review i s a p p l i e d to 
mixed q u e s t i o n s of law and f a c t , which "are o f ten i l l u m i n a t e d by 
an agency ' s e x p e r t i s e , and s p e c i a l t e c h n i c a l knowledge may be of 
p a r t i c u l a r he lp in determining whether the f a c t s f a l l w i t h i n the 
meaning of s t a t u t o r y t e rms . " Hurley, supra , 767 P.2d a t 527. 
T h e r e f o r e , an agency ' s " a p p l i c a t i o n of law to i t s f a c t u a l f i n d -
ings" w i l l not be d i s t u r b e d "unless i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n exceeds the 
bounds of r easonab leness and r a t i o n a l i t y . " Johnson, s u p r a , 782 
P.2d a t 968. 
The reasonable and r a t i o n a l s t anda rd was a p p l i c a b l e to 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of mixed law and fac t q u e s t i o n s under the common 
law, even p r i o r to adoption of the APA in Utah. The s t a n d a r d 
evo lves out of the concept t h a t deference should be given to mat-
t e r s t h a t a re p e c u l i a r l y wi th in the scope of agency e x p e r t i s e : 
This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y held t h a t : 
Due to the complexity of f a c t o r s involved in 
the ma t t e r of zoning, as in o the r f i e l d s 
where c o u r t s review the a c t i o n s of admin is -
t r a t i v e bod ie s , i t should be assumed t h a t 
2
 Although respondents' position is that the issues resolved below were 
neither purely factual nor purely legal, i t cannot be said that the evidence 
presented below fails to meet even the standard. Indeed, the Board does not 
even attempt to meet the burden of this standard and has neither marshalled 
the evidence nor attempted to show why that evidence is not sufficient under 
this standard. Such an omission is fatal to the Board's position, even if i t 
could be said that the Commission's determinations were purely factual-
- 1 2 -
those charged with that responsibility (the 
Board) have specialized knowledge in that 
field. Accordingly, [administrative agen-
cies] should be allowed a comparatively wide 
latitude of discretion; and their actions 
endowed with a presumption of correctness and 
validity which the courts should not inter-
fere with unless it is shown that there is no 
reasonable basis to justify the action taken. 
Xanthos v. Board of Adiustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 
1034 (Utah 1984) (quoting, Cottonwood Heights Citizen Association 
v. Board of Commissioners, 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1979)). 
Applicability of the FAA to real property use consti-
tutes precisely the kind of mixed question of law and fact to 
which the deferential standard of review is applied: 
An agency's interpretation of key provisions 
of the statute it is empowered to administer 
is often inseparable from its application of 
the rules of law to the basic facts, dis-
cussed above. In reviewing decisions such as 
these, a court should afford great deference 
to the technical expertise or more extensive 
experience of the responsible agency. 
• * * 
The degree of deference extended to the 
decisions of the Commission on these interme-
diate types of issues has been given various 
expressions, but all are variations of the 
idea that the Commission's decisions must 
fall within the limits of reasonableness and 
rationality. As used in this context, the 
words "arbitrary and capricious" mean no more 
than this. 
Utah Dept. of Admin. Services v. Public Service Commiss., 658 
P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983). Therefore, the Commission's decision 
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in favor of FAA assessment of the Subject Property First be 
affirmed by this Court unless the Board can show that it was 
arbitrary and capricious. This, the Board has failed to do. 
B. The Board has Failed to Establish that 
the Commission's Decision was Arbitrary 
and Capricious. 
One of the Board's principal arguments, both below and 
on appeal, is that the Subject Property, standing alone, does not 
meet the statutory requirements for FAA assessment because it 
doesn't generate sufficient income and isn't of sufficient acre-
age. The Board makes no legitimate effort to establish that the 
Commission's finding that the combined Judd Farm fulfills those 
standards is not reasonable or rational. Indeed, this Court 
could take judicial notice of the fact that the combined property 
exceeds five acres in area. See Appendix 2. Likewise, the tes-
timony below regarding the "agricultural income" of the combined 
property was essentially undisputed, the Board having focused, 
instead, on whether there were receipts kept of income generated 
solely by the Separate Property. 
The Board's focus on the Subject Property depends upon 
two erroneous premises: First, that the Subject Property is sep-
arate from the Original Property and, therefore, must be consid-
ered on its own (with respect to this argument, see Sections II 
and III, infra) : and, Second, that the 1989 use of the Separate 
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Property, unlike the use of the Original Property, does not qual-
ify as "agr icu l tu ra l use" under the FAA. Both of these premises 
were rejected by the Commission. The second premise depends upon 
the Board's argument that the recording of a subdivision p la t 
map, which includes the Subject Property, and the "improvement" 
of the Subject Property with curb and gu t te r , sewer and u t i l i t y 
hookups, without respect to actual use, renders the Subject Prop-
er ty non-agr icu l tu ra l . S igni f icant ly , there is no s t a tu to ry sup-
3 
port for such a pos i t ion . Indeed, the FAA i t s e l f obviously con-
templates that the determination of "agr icu l tu ra l use" depends 
upon the actual use of the property during the tax year in ques-
t ion , ra ther than upon any "potent ia l" higher use that the land 
may have. Thus, Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-502(1) defines "land in 
ag r i cu l tu r a l use" as land that is "devoted to the ra is ing of use-
ful p lants . . . " o r that meets the requirements of "a crop-land 
retirement program with an agency of the s t a t e or federal 
government." 
3
 In support of th i s argument, the Board refers the Court to Nevada and 
Arizona case law. That case law i s inapposite, however, since both of those 
s ta tes provide, by s ta tu te , that the recording of a subdivision plat on the 
property renders i t s use "non-agricultural ." Significantly, Utah has no such 
s t a tu t e and the Commission, in keeping with th i s Court 's d i rec t ive that tax 
laws are interpreted in favor of the taxpayer (See Salt Lake County v. State 
Tax Commission, in f ra ) , decided not to impose such a r e s t r i c t i on where i t does 
not exis t in the Act. 
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The "devoted to" language of this section of the FAA 
has been previously interpreted by this Court in Salt Lake County 
v. State Tax Commission, 779 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1989). In that 
case, as in this one, the Commission granted FAA assessment of 
the taxpayer's property, and its decision was appealed by the 
Board. The property at issue in that case was owned by Kennecott 
Corporation and leased to Hercules, Inc. for a buffer zone around 
its manufacturing plant in Magna. Hercules had subleased the 
subject property to third parties for grazing and growing wheat. 
The Board argued that the property was used by Hercules "for 
industrial purposes" and, therefore, did not qualify as "land in 
agricultural use." 
This Court disagreed with the Board's construction of 
the FAA, and affirmed the Commission's decision, stating: 
[The Board's] construction would be required 
if the statute read "exclusively" or even 
"primarily" devoted to an agricultural use. 
No such terms appear in the statute, however, 
and its plain meaning does not require such a 
construction. In fact, our practice is to 
construe taxation statutes liberally in favor 
of the taxpayer, leaving it to the legisla-
ture to clarify an intent to be more restric-
tive if such intent exists. The legislature 
has determined that if land in Utah is used 
for agricultural purposes, that land is qual-
ified for assessment under the Act. 
We reject the County's argument that the 
word "devoted" requires exclusive use. Land 
may be actively devoted to multiple purposes. 
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779 P.2d at 1132-33 (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
The Salt Lake County rationale governs the present 
case. The Commission found, based upon the evidence presented at 
the hearing below, that the Subject Property was devoted to agri-
cultural use since the Subject Property was a contiguous part of 
the Judd Farm and was used for both wheat farming and a federal 
crop-land retirement program for the relevant years. Both of the 
uses to which the Subject Property was devoted in the years 
1987-89 are specifically qualified as "agricultural use" under 
the FAA. Pursuant to Salt Lake County, the fact that the Subject 
Property may have other, potential, uses does not disqualify it 
from FAA assessment. The uncontroverted evidence established 
that the Subject Property was not actively used for subdivision 
purposes (such as home construction, rights of way, etc.) at any 
time during the relevant time period. Indeed, the Subject Prop-
erty has only slightly greater potential for such uses than does 
the Original Property, which the Board does not contend is not 
"devoted to" agricultural use. 
The Commission's finding that the Subject Property is 
"devoted to agricultural use," within the meaning of the FAA, is 
fully supported by the evidence and cannot in any way be said to 
be arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, that finding must be 
aff irmed. 
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II. THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IS NOT .'LICA-
BLE TO DETERMINATIONS OF TAX LIABILITY IN 
DIFFERENT TAX YEARS. 
The Board contends that the decision of the Third Judi-
cial District Court (Civil No. 87-3472), to the effect that the 
Subject Property did not qualify for greenbelt assessment under 
the FAA for the tax year 1985, is "res judicata" in this action. 
Therefore, the Board argues, the Commission was compelled to rule 
that the current petition for FAA assessment, which covers tax 
year 1989, did not satisfy the Actfs requirements. 
Res judicata precludes relitigation of identical causes 
of action in subsequent proceedings. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1947). The related concept 
of collateral estoppel, which is obviously the principle upon 
which the Board actually relies, precludes relitigation of issues 
"which were actually presented and determined in the first suit." 
Id. In this case, the Commission ruled that "res judicata" was 
not applicable since the petitions involved different factual 
issues. That ruling is supported by both the United States and 
Utah Supreme Courts. 
Thus, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 
supra, the Court considered the issue of whether income from pat-
ents should be taxed to an individual taxpayer or to a corpora-
tion in which he owned a controlling interest since the taxpayer 
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had licensed the patent to the corporation. The taxpayer's posi-
tion was that a previous Board of Tax Appeals decision in his 
favor on that issue, covering prior tax years, was res judicata 
in the subject action. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that 
tax liability in different tax years typically involves changes 
in significant facts: 
Income taxes are levied on an annual basis. 
Each year is the origin of a new liability 
and of a separate cause of action. Thus if a 
claim of liability or non-liability relating 
to the particular tax year is litigated, a 
judgment on the merits is res judicata as to 
any subsequent proceeding involving the same 
claim and the same tax year. But if the 
later proceeding is concerned with a similar 
or unlike claim relating to a different tax 
year, the prior judgment acts as a collateral 
estoppel only as to those matters in the sec-
ond proceeding which were actually presented 
and determined in the first suit. 
* * * 
And so where two cases involve income 
taxes in different taxable years, collateral 
estoppel must be used with its limitations 
carefully in mind so as to avoid injustice. 
It must be confined to situations where the 
matter raised in the second suit is identical 
in all respects with that decided in the 
first proceeding and where the controlling 
facts and applicable legal rules remain 
unchanged. 
333 U.S. at 598, 599-600 (emphasis added). In Sunnen, the prior 
ruling had involved consideration of a different, albeit essen-
tially identical, licensing contract than the one at issue. 
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Under those circumstances, the Court found it "readily appr -ent" 
that collateral estoppel did not apply, and the Tax Court's deci-
sion against the taxpayer was affirmed. 
The Utah Supreme Court also has considered the princi-
ple of res judicata in connection with tax liability, and simi-
larly has held that it is generally not applicable in such cases, 
stat ing: 
Generally, in tax litigation, res judicata 
has no application in a suit challenging the 
propriety of a tax obligation accrued in tax 
periods subsequent to those at issue in the 
original litigation. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Salt Lake City, 596 P.2d 649, 
651 (Utah 1979). In that case, the Court considered the consti-
tutionality of Salt Lake City's franchise fee and utility revenue 
tax. The tax previously had been upheld on appeal as constitu-
tional. However, the tax had increased from two to eight percent 
in the interim. The City argued that the prior decision of con-
stitutionality was res judicata. 
The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, on the grounds that 
the tax years in question were different and the commercial situ-
ation for telephone suppliers (such as the plaintiff in that 
case) had changed since the prior decision by virtue of several 
FCC decisions. Therefore, summary judgment entered by the trial 
court in the City's favor was reversed. 
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In the prior related case at issue, the District Court 
ruled that the Subject Property was not qualified for FAA assess-
ment for tax year 1985 because it was "separated" from the Origi-
nal Property by virtue of the recording of the subdivision plat 
map (R.55, 11 1), and because the Subject Property, alone, was 
"not 'actively devoted to agricultural use1 in 1985" (id., U 5, 
emphasis added). That conclusion was based, rightly or wrongly, 
on facts that existed in 1985, and the two years prior thereto 
(See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503(1)(d)). Those facts included the 
transfer of the Subdivision Property to McGhie and the improve-
ment of the property in the early 1980's. 
The present case concerns tax liability of the Subject 
Property in 1989 and involves use of the property some four years 
after the use that was considered by the District Court. That 
use was considered by the Commission and determined to qualify 
the Subject Property for FAA assessment. The Board cannot rea-
sonably contend that the Commission's determination, which the 
Board has not seriously attempted to show was not supported by 
substantial evidence, should be replaced by a District Court 
determination regarding use some four years previous thereto. 
Such an absurd result is absolutely precluded by the Sunnen and 
Mountain States decisions. 
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In any event, a finding by the D i s t r i c t Court *:u-z the 
Subject Property was "separated" from the Original Property for 
the tax year 1985, even if given c o l l a t e r a l estoppel e f fec t , 
would not compel a di f ferent r e s u l t , since there is nothing in 
the FAA that precludes the addition of property to an already 
4 qua l i f i ed pa rce l . Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-504 allows the owner of 
property that qua l i f i e s under the def in i t ions of the FAA to apply 
for FAA assessment of that property at any time. The s t a t u t o r y 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are only that the land be "devoted to" a g r i c u l -
t u r a l use and have been so devoted for a period of two years . 
Thus, the relevant consideration is whether the Subject Property 
was devoted to ag r i cu l tu ra l use in 1987 through 1989 (a period 
never considered by the d i s t r i c t court , despi te the date of i t s 
dec i s ion ) , and not whether the Subject Property was "separated" 
from the Original Property at any time pr ior t he re to . 
Thus, whether or not the Subject Property was indeed 
"separated" from the or ig ina l property pr ior to 1987 is 
4
 Indeed, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503(1)(a) specif ical ly provides that qual-
i f ied property need not exceed five acres in area where i t i s "devoted to 
ag r i cu l tu ra l use in conjunction with other e l ig ib le acreage . . ."(emphasis 
added). This provision strongly supports the Judds' posi t ion, which was 
accepted by the Commission, that property can be added to qual if ied property, 
even if previously separated. There i s nothing in the Act, as the Board 
implies, requir ing an owner of "subdivision" property to aff irmatively prove 
i t s "withdrawal" from the subdivision. The FAA requires only that the prop-
er ty be "devoted to agr icul tura l use." 
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irrelevant. The Commission has determined, using its expertise 
in applying tax law, that the Subject Property need not indepen-
dently qualify for FAA assessment where it is operated as a sin-
gle unit with FAA qualified property and is devoted to agricul-
tural use. That decision cannot be said to be arbitrary or 
capricious. 
III. PETITIONER'S THIRD ARGUMENT ERRONEOUSLY PRE-
SUPPOSES THE VALIDITY OF ITS SEPARATION OF 
PROPERTIES ARGUMENT. 
The Board's third argument in its brief is that the 
Judds failed to establish that the Subject Property qualified for 
FAA assessment in 1989 since it is not five acres in area and 
does not generate $1,000 in "agricultural income." This argument 
depends entirely on the erroneous premise that the Subject Prop-
erty may only be considered on its own merits, independently of 
the Original Property. However, that requirement is not war-
ranted by the facts of this case, and presupposes the legitimacy 
of the Board's argument that the Subject Property was "separate" 
from the Original Property in 1989. 
The evidence below established that there is no physi-
cal separation in the Judd Farm, even though some physical sepa-
ration is allowable under the FAA. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-515, granting rulemaking authority to the Commission, and 
"Assessors Handbook," (Appendix 2 to Appellant's Brief), at 14, 
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U 9, which was promulgated under that authority. On the con-
trary, the property is fenced as a contiguous unit, and is owned, 
leased and operated as a single unit. Under these facts, there 
is no question but that the Judd Farm, if it had never before 
been assessed under the FAA, would be found to qualify, in its 
entirety, for such assessment. The fact that the Original Prop-
erty has always qualified for FAA assessment should not operate 
to the prejudice of the Judds in obtaining FAA assessment of the 
Subject Property, nor should the fact that the Subject Property 
may once have been separated from the Original Property preclude 
it from ever becoming a part of that property again. Indeed, no 
such obstacles to FAA assessment can be found in the Act itself. 
The Commission's decision in favor of FAA assessment of 
the Subject Property necessarily determines that the Subject 
Property need not independently qualify for FAA assessment, 
whether or not it was once separated from the Original Property, 
so long as all of the property is operated as a single unit. 
Such a decision, applying the law to the facts, is not arbitrary 
or capricious, but is in fact the proper construction of the FAA. 
Indeed, it would make no more sense to require the separate prop-
erty to independently meet the FAA requirements than it would to 
impose the same requirement on any other acreage within the Judd 
Farm. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Commission's decision that the Subject Property, 
used in conjunction with the Original Property, qualifies for 
greenbelt assessment under the FAA is reasonable and rational and 
supported by the evidence below. Therefore, the Board has failed 
to meet its burden on appeal, and the Commission's decision must 
be affirmed by this Court. 
DATED this 30th day of September, 1991. 
CENT W. WINTERHOLLER 
JULIA C. ATTWOOD 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondents/ 
Appellees Judd 
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APPENDIX 1 
«ki 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
'J «>*££" 
THOMAS E. & MARY LU E. JUDD, ) 
Petitioners, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
V. ) AND FINAL DECISION 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF ) Appeal Nos. 90-0528 to 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Respondent. ) 
90-0539 
Serial Nos. See Attachment 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The above-referenced appeals, having been consolidated 
for hearing and decision, came before the Tax Commission for 
formal hearing on October 22, 1990. Alan Hennebold, Presiding 
Officer, conducted the proceedings for and on behalf of the Tax 
Commission. Petitioners, Thomas E. Judd and Mary Lu E. Judd, 
appeared on their own behalf. Bill Thomas Peters appeared on 
behalf of the Respondent. 
Based on the evidence presented during the hearing in 
this matter, and after consideration of the parties' post 
hearing memoranda, the Tax Commission makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is property tax. The 
Petitioners seek assessment of the subject properties under the 
Farmland Assessment Act, Utah Code Ann. §59-2-501 et seq. 
2. The period in question is January 1, 1989. 
3. The subject properties are 12 vacant lots owned 
by the Petitioners and located in a residential subdivision at 
approximately 9213 South 3730 West, West Jordan, Utah. Each 
lot consists of 1/4 acre with curb, gutter and utilities. 
4. The Petitioners also own a 29 acre farm (the 
"Judd farm" hereafter) directly east of the subject 
properties. The Judd farm has qualified for valuation under 
the Farmland Assessment Act during all years material hereto. 
5. From 1987 through 1989, the subject properties 
were fenced except on their east side where they adjoined the 
Judd farm. During those three years, the subject properties 
and the Judd farm (the "combined properties" hereafter) were 
operated as a single unit. 
6. In 1987, Stanley Diamond rented and grew wheat on 
the combined properties. After the wheat was harvested, 
Bateman Farms replaced Diamond as renter. Bateman Farms 
cultivated the land, then placed it in a crop-land retirement 
program administered by the federal Department of Agriculture 
for the 1988 crop year. During the fall of 1988, Bateman Farms 
planted wheat, then harvested it during the summer of 1989. 
Afterwards, Bateman Brothers again placed the combined 
properties in a federal crop-land retirement program for 1990. 
5. Neither the Petitioners nor their renters 
maintained records of the agricultural income derived from the 
subject properties alone. However, more than $1,000 in gross 
agricultural income was derived from the combined properties 
during each year from 1987 through 1989. 
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6. iy«b, tne petitioners sov ^ nt assessment of the 
subject properties under the Farmland Assessment Act. The Tax 
Commission denied their request. Following the Petitioners' 
further appeal, the Tax Division of Utah's Third Judicial 
District Court affirmed the denial of Petitioners' request far^ 
farmland assessment for the 1986 tax year. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Utah Farmland Assessment Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§59-2-501 et seq. , permits assessment of land at its value for 
agricultural use, under the following criteria: 
a. The land is not less than five contiguous acres, 
except where devoted to agricultural use in conjunction with 
other eligible acres. 
b. The land has a gross income from agricultural use, 
not including rental income, of at least $1000 per year; 
c. The land is actively devoted to agricultural use; 
and 
d. The land has been devoted to agricultural use for 
at least two successive years immediately preceding the tax 
year in issue. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Generally, land is assessed for property tax purposes 
according to its "highest and best" use. Utah's Farmland 
Assessment Act provides an exception to the foregoing rule by 
allowing assessment of land according to its agricultural 
value, even if some other use might result in a higher value. 
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Three conditions must be met bt jre land can be 
assessed under the Farmland Assessment Act. First, the land 
must be at least five acres in size, or be devoted to 
agricultural use in conjunction with other eligible acreage. 
Second, the land must have a gross income from- agricultural 
use, not including rental income, of at least $1,000 per year. 
Finally, the property must be actively dedicated to 
agricultural use during the year for which farmland assessment 
is sought and for two prior years. The Petitioners contend the 
subject properties meet each of the foregoing conditions. 
Regarding the requirement that the land contain at 
least five acres or be devoted to agricultural use in 
connection with other eligible acreage, it is undisputed that 
the subject properties amount to less than five acres even when 
added together. However, during 1987 through 1989 the subject 
properties and the remainder of the Judd farm were farmed as 
one unit. The Judd farm has already been found eligible for 
assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act. The Tax 
Commission therefore finds that the subject properties were 
devoted to agricultural use in connection with other eligible 
acres, thereby satisfying the first condition for assessment as 
farmland. 
The second requirement is that the properties produce 
gross income from agricultural use, excluding rental income, of 
at least $1,000 per year. The Tax Commission notes the 
Respondent's argument that each of the subject properties must 
separately meet the $1,000 income requirement. However, in 
cases where land is combined for agricultural purposes with 
-4-
^*^±u±*s ina, the Tax Commission concludes the $1,000 
income requirement applies to aggregate value of agricultural 
production from the combined properties. The Petitioners have 
established that the combined properties produced more than 
$1,000 in gross income from agricultural use during each year 
from 1987 through 1989. The Tax Commission concludes the 
subject properties meet the Farmland Assessment Act's income 
test. 
Finally, the land must be actively devoted to 
agricultural use during the year for which farmland valuation 
is sought, as well as the two preceding years. That the 
property may have uses in addition to its agricultural use does 
not prevent the property from qualifying for farmland 
assessment. Salt Lake County ex rel. County Board of 
Equalization v. State Tax Commission ex rel. Kennecott Corp., 
779 P. 2d 1131 (Utah 1989) The testimony of the Petitioners 
and their renters establishes that the subject property was 
either actively devoted to agricultural production from 1987 
through 1989 or was included in federal crop reduction 
programs, which are recognized by the Farmland Assessment Act 
as being active agricultural use. The Petitioners thereby meet 
the Farmland Assessment Act's requirement of active 
agricultural use. 
The Respondent argues that prior decisions denying 
Petitioners' request for farmland assessment for the 1986 tax 
year are binding with respect to the 1989 tax year as well. 
Respondent contends that principles of collateral estoppel bar 
relitigation of the factual issues which were litigated and 
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iOesolved in the 1986 case. The Respondent's position is 
correct as a general principle. However, because the factual 
basis upon which farmland assessment is based changes from year 
to year, property not qualifying one year may qualify the 
next. The interpretation of law is not subject to collateral 
estoppel in any event. Consequently, the Tax Commission and 
District Court decisions on the 1986 appeal do not serve as a 
basis for resolving this 1989 appeal. 
As the Petitioners have demonstrated that the subject 
properties meet each conditions set forth in the Farmland 
Assessment Act, the Tax Commission concludes that the 
Petitioners' request for assessment under that Act must be 
granted for the 1989 tax year. The Salt Lake County Assessor 
and Auditor are instructed to adjust their records and take 
such other action as is necessary to implement this decision. 
DATED this XA day of _M, , 1991. 
BY ORDER OP THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
roe B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Cojsc^525^ 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46^^0^^^ >; 
63-46b-14<2> (a) . ^ > <<% 
'x. 
AH/jd/1647w 
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PART 5 
FARMLAND ASSESSMENT ACT 
59-2-501. Short title. 
This part is known as the 'Farmland Assessment 
Act" 1987 
59-2-502. Definitions. 
As used in this part 
(1) 'Land in agricultural u se ' means 
(a) land devoted to the raising of useful 
plants and animals, such as 
d) forages and sod crops, 
<n) grains and feed crops, 
(in) livestock as defined in Section 
59-2-102, 
Ov) trees and fruits, or 
(v) vegetables, nursery, floral, and or-
namental stock, or 
(b) land devoted to and meeting the re-
quirements and qualifications for payments 
or other compensation under a crop-land re-
tirement program with an agency of the 
state or federal government 
(2) "Roll-back" means the period preceding the 
withdrawal of the land from the provisions of this 
part or the change in use of the land, not to ex-
ceed five years, during which the land is valued, 
assessed, and taxed under this part 1988 
59-2-503. Qualifications for agricultural use val-
uation. 
(1) For general property tax purposes, the value of 
land under this part is the value which the land has 
for agricultural use if the land 
(a) is not less than five contiguous acres in 
area, except where devoted to agricultural use in 
conjunction with other eligible acreage or as pro-
vided under Subsection (3), 
(b) has a gross income from agricultural use t 
not including rental income, of at least $1000 per 
year, 
(c) is actively devoted to agricultural use, and 
(d) has been devoted to agricultural use for at 
least two successive years immediately preceding 
the tax year in issue 
(2) Land which (a) is subject to the privilege tax 
imposed by Section 59 4-101, (b) is owned by the state 
or any of its political subdivisions, and (c) meets the 
requirements of Subsection <1), is eligible for assess-
ment based on its agricultural value 
(3) The commission may grant a waiver of the 
acreage limitation, upon appeal by the owner and 
submission of proof that 80% or more of the owner's, 
purchasers, or lessees income is derived from agri-
cultural products produced on the property in ques-
tion 
(4) (a) The commission may grant a waiver of the 
income limitation for the tax year in issue, upon 
appeal by the owner and submission of proof that 
the land was valued on the basis of agricultural 
use for at least two years immediately preceding 
that tax year, and that the failure to meet the 
income requirements for that tax year was due to 
no fault or act of the owner, purchaser, or lessee 
(b) As used in this section, "fault" does not in-
clude the intentional planting of crops or trees 
which, because of the maturation period, do not 
give the owner, purchaser, or lessee a reasonable 
opportunity to satisfy the income requirement 
1987 
59-2-504. Application requirements — Change 
in land use or withdrawal. 
(1) The owner of land eligible for valuation under 
this part shall submit an application to the county 
assessor of the county in which the land is located 
Applications shall be accepted if filed prior to March 
I of the tax year in which valuation under this part is 
first requested Any application submitted after Jan-
uary 1 is subject to a $25 late filing fee Filing fees 
shall be paid to the county treasurer at the time the 
application is filed All applications filed under this 
subsection shall be recorded by the county recorder. 
(2) Once valuation under this part has been ap-
proved, the owner is not required either to file again 
or give any notice to the county assessor, until a 
change in the land use occurs Failure of the owner to 
notify the county assessor and pay the roll-back tax 
imposed by Section 59-2-506 within 90 days after any 
change in land use subjects the owner to a penalty of 
100% of the roll-back tax due. 
(3) Any change in land use or other withdrawal of 
land from the provisions of this part subjects the land 
to the roll-back tax whether the change or with-
drawal is voluntary or involuntary, unless the change 
in use or other withdrawal is due to ineligibility re-
sulting solely from amendments to this part. 
(4) Land which becomes exempt from taxation un-
der Article XIII, Sec 2, Utah Constitution, is not con-
sidered withdrawn from this part if the land con-
tinues to be used for agricultural purposes 1987 
59-2-505. Indicia of value for agricultural use 
assessment — Inclusion of fair market 
value on tax notice. 
If valuing land which qualifies as land actively de-
voted to agricultural use under the test prescribed by 
Subsection 59-2-503(1), and for which the owner has 
made a timely application for valuation, assessment, 
and taxation under this part for the tax year in issue, 
the assessor shall consider only those indicia of value 
which the land has for agricultural use as determined 
by the commission The assessor shall also include 
the fair market value assessment on the tax notice 
The county board of equalization shall review the ag-
ricultural use value and fair market value assess-
ments each year as provided under Section 59-2-1001. 
1987 
59-2-506. Rollback tax — Recordation — Lien — 
Computation of tax — Procedure — 
Collection — Distribution. 
(1) If land which is or has been in agricultural use, 
and is or has been valued, assessed, and taxed under 
this part, is applied to a use other than agricultural 
or is otherwise withdrawn from the provisions of this 
part, it is subject to an additional tax referred to as 
the "rollback tax," and the owner shall, within 90 
days after the change m land use, notify the county 
assessor of the change in land use and pay the roll-
back tax 
(2) Upon receipt of the notice, the county assessor 
shall cause the following statement to be recorded by 
the county recorder MOn ( date ) this land became 
subject to the rollback tax imposed by Section 
59-2-506 " 
(3) The rollback tax is a hen upon the land until 
paid, and is due and pa>able at the time of the change 
in use. 
(4) The assessor shall determine the amount of the 
rollback tax by computing the difference between the 
tax paid while the land was valued under this part, 
and that which would have been paid had the prop-
erty not been valued under this part The county trea-
surer shall collect the rollback tax and certify to the 
county recorder that the rollback tax hen on the prop-
erty has been satisfied 
(5) The assessment of the rollback tax imposed by 
Subsection (1), the attachment of the hen for these 
taxes, and the right of the owner or other interested 
party to review any judgment of the county board of 
equalization affecting the rollback tax, shall be gov-
erned by the procedures provided for the assessment 
and taxation of real property not valued, assessed, 
and taxed under this part. The rollback tax collected 
shall be paid into the county treasury and paid by the 
treasurer to the various taxing units pro rata in ac-
cordance with the levies for the current year i&87 
59-2-507. Land included as agricultural — Site 
of farmhouse excluded — Taxation of 
structures and site of farmhouse. 
(1) Land under barns, sheds, silos, cribs, green-
houses and like structures, lakes, dams, ponds, 
streams, and irrigation ditches and like facilities is 
included in determining the total area of land 
actively devoted to agricultural use. Land which is 
under the farmhouse and land used in connection 
with the farmhouse, is excluded from that determina-
tion. 
(2) All structures which are located on land in ag-
ricultural use, the farmhouse and the land on which 
the farmhouse is located, and land used in connection 
with the farmhouse, shall be valued, assessed, and 
taxed using the same standards, methods, and proce-
dures that apply to other taxable structures and other 
land in the county. 1987 
59-2-508. Application — Consent to audit and 
review — Purchaser's or lessee's affi-
davit 
(1) Any application for valuation, assessment, and 
taxation of land in agricultural use shall be on a form 
prescribed by the commission, and provided for the 
use of the applicants by the county assessor The ap-
plication shall provide for the reporting of informa-
tion pertinent to this part A certification by the 
owner that the facts set forth in the application are 
true may be prescribed by the commission in lieu of a 
sworn statement to that effect Statements so certi-
fied are considered as if made under oath and subject 
to the same penalties as provided by law for perjury. 
(2) All owners applying for participation under 
this part and all purchasers or lessees signing affida-
vits under Subsection (3) are considered to have given 
their consent to field audit and review by both the 
commission and the county assessor. This consent is a 
condition to the acceptance of any application or affi-
davit 
(3) Any owner of lands eligible for valuation, as-
sessment, and taxation under this part due to the use 
of that land by, and the gross income qualifications 
of, a purchaser or lessee, may qualify those lands by 
submitting, together with the application under Sub-
section (1), an affidavit from that purchaser or lessee 
certifying those facts relative to the use of the land 
and the purchaser's or lessee's gross income which 
would be necessary for qualification of those lands 
under this part 1987 
59-2-509. Change of ownership. 
Continuance of valuation, assessment, and taxa-
tion under this part depends upon continuance of the 
land in agricultural use and compliance with the 
other requirements of this part, and not upon contin-
uance in the same owner of title to the land Liability 
to the roll-back tax attaches when a change m use or 
other withdrawal of the land occurs, but not when a 
change in ownership of the title takes place, if the 
new owner both (1) continues the land in agricul-
tural use under the conditions prescribed in this part, 
and <2) files a new application for valuation, assess-
ment, and taxation as provided in Section 59-2 508 
1887 
59-2-510. Separation of land. 
Separation of a part of the land which is being val-
ued, assessed and taxed under this part, either by 
conveyance or other action of the owner of the land, 
for a use other than agricultural, subjects the land 
which is separated to liability for the applicable roil-
back tax, but does not impair the continuance of agri-
cultural use valuation, assessment, and taxation for 
the remaining land if it continues to meet the re-
quirements of this part 1887 
59-2-511. Acquisition of farmland by govern-
ment agency — Requirements. 
(1) The acquisition by a government agency of land 
which is being valued, assessed, and taxed under this 
part, if there is a change in use, subjects the land so 
acquired to the rollback tax imposed by this part, 
unless 
(a) the land acquisition is by eminent domain, 
(b) the land is under the threat or imminence 
of eminent domain proceedings and the owner of 
record is notified in writing of the proceedings, or 
(c) the land is donated to a governmental en-
tity, but excluding dedications of public rights-of-
way 
(2) The tax shall be paid by the owner of record 
before title may pass Prior to payment by the acquir-
ing agency, it shall notify the county assessor of the 
county in which the property is located of the sale and 
receive a clearance from the assessor that rollback 
taxes have been paid or that the property is not sub-
ject to the assessment 
(3) If land is acquired pursuant to Subsection 
(l)(a), (b), or (c)f the acquiring government agency 
shall make a one-time in lieu fee payment to the tax-
ing entity entitled to the rollback tax in the amount 
of the rollback tax due and payable 1990 
59-2-512. Land located in more than one county. 
Where contiguous land in agricultural use in one 
ownership is located in more than one county, compli-
ance with the requirements of this part shall be de-
termined on the basis of the total area and income of 
that land, and not the area or income of land which is 
located in any particular county 1987 
59-2-513. Tax list and duplicate. 
The factual details to be shoun on the assessors's 
tax list and duplicate with respect to land which is 
being valued, assessed, and taxed under this part are 
the same as those set forth by the assessor with re-
spect to other taxable property in the county 1987 
59-2-514. State Farmland Evaluation Advisory 
Committee — Membership — Duties. 
(1) There is created a State Farmland Evaluation 
Advisory Committee consisting of five members ap-
pointed as follows 
(a) one member appointed by the commission 
who shall be chairman of the committee, 
(b) one member appointed by the president of 
Utah State University, 
(c) one member appointed by the state Depart-
ment of Agriculture, 
(d) one member appointed by the state County 
Assessors' Association, and 
(e) one member actively engaged in farming or 
ranching appointed by the other members of the 
committee 
(2) The committee shall meet at the call of the 
chairman to review the several classifications of land 
in agricultural use in the various areas of the state 
and recommend a range of values for each of the clas-
sifications based upon productive capabilities of the 
land when devoted to agricultural uses The recom-
mendations bhall be submitted to the commission 
prior to October 2 of each year 1987 
59-2-515. Rules prescribed by commission. 
The commission may promulgate rules and pre-
scribe forms necessary to effectuate the purposes of 
this part 1987 
